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Abstract
We introduce a new family of rank metric codes: Low Rank Parity Check codes
(LRPC), for which we propose an efficient probabilistic decoding algorithm. This
family of codes can be seen as the equivalent of classical LDPC codes for the rank
metric. We then use these codes to design cryptosystems à la McEliece: more precisely
we propose two schemes for key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and public key
encryption (PKE). Unlike rank metric codes used in previous encryption algorithms
-notably Gabidulin codes - LRPC codes have a very weak algebraic structure. Our
cryptosystems can be seen as an equivalent of the NTRU cryptosystem (and also to the
more recent MDPC [35] cryptosystem) in a rank metric context. The present paper
is an extended version of the article introducing LRPC codes, with important new
contributions. We have improved the decoder thanks to a new approach which allows
for decoding of errors of higher rank weight, namely up to 23(n−k) when the previous
decoding algorithm only decodes up to n−k2 errors. Our codes therefore outperform the
classical Gabidulin code decoder which deals with weights up to n−k2 . This comes at
the expense of probabilistic decoding, but the decoding error probability can be made
arbitrarily small. The new approach can also be used to decrease the decoding error
probability of previous schemes, which is especially useful for cryptography. Finally,
we introduce ideal rank codes, which generalize double-circulant rank codes and allow
us to avoid known structural attacks based on folding. To conclude, we propose
different parameter sizes for our schemes and we obtain a public key of 3337 bits for
key exchange and 5893 bits for public key encryption, both for 128 bits of security.
1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a burst of activity in the field of post-quantum cryptography,
whose appeal has become even more apparent since the recent attacks on the discrete
logarithm problem in small characteristic [6]. These events stress that unexpected new
attacks on classical cryptographic systems can appear at any time and that it is important
not to have all one’s eggs in the same basket.
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Among potential candidates for alternative cryptography, lattice-based and code-based
cryptography are strong candidates. Rank-based cryptography relies on the difficulty of
decoding error-correcting codes embedded in a rank metric space (often over extension fields
of fields of prime order), when code-based cryptography relies on difficult problems related
to error-correcting codes embedded in Hamming metric spaces (often over small fields Fq)
and when lattice-based cryptography is mainly based on the study of q-ary lattices, which
can be seen as codes over rings of type Z/qZ (for large q), embedded in Euclidean metric
spaces.
The particular appeal of the rank metric is that the practical difficulty of the decoding
problems grows very quickly with the size of parameters. In particular, it is possible to
reach a complexity of 280 for random instances with size only a few thousand bits, while
for lattices or codes, at least a hundred thousand bits are needed. Of course with codes
and lattices it is possible to decrease the size to a few thousand bits but with additional
structure like quasi-cyclicity [7], which comes at the cost of losing reductions to known
difficult problems. The rank metric was introduced by Delsarte and Gabidulin [15], along
with Gabidulin codes which are a rank-metric equivalent of Reed-Solomon codes. Since
then, rank metric codes have been used for many applications: coding theory and space-
time coding in particular and also for cryptography. Until now the main tool for rank based
cryptography was based on masking Gabidulin codes [17] in different ways and using the
McEliece (or Niederreiter) setting with these codes. Most cryptosystems based on this idea
were broken by using structural attacks which exploit the particular structure of Gabidulin
codes ([39], [14], [8], [28],[16]). A similar situation exists in the Hamming case for which
all cryptosystems based on Reed-Solomon codes have been broken for a similar reason:
Reed-Solomon codes are so structured that they are difficult to mask and there is always
structural information leaking.
Since the introduction of code-based cryptography by McEliece in 1978, the different
cryptosystems proposed in the Hamming distance setting were based on masking a special
family of decodable codes, like Goppa, Reed-Muller of Reed-Solomon codes. The strong
structure of these codes usually implies a large public key size. Now in 1996 and 1997, two
lattice-based cryptosystems were proposed independently: the NTRU [26] and the GGH
[23] cryptosystems which can be seen as McEliece-type cryptosystems but for the Euclidean
distance. Lattice based cryptography can be seen as code-based cryptography with q-ary
(large alphabet) codes and Euclidean distance rather than the Hamming distance. Both
the NTRU and GGH cryptosystems are based on the same idea: knowing a random basis
of small weight vectors enables one to obtain an efficient decoding algorithm suitable for
cryptography. Moreover, the NTRU cryptosysem (which can be seen as an optimized case of
the GGH cryptosystem [33]) introduced for the first time the idea of using double-circulant
matrices in order to decrease the size of the public key. This idea was made possible because
of the randomness of the small dual basis. Finally, we remark that for 15 years the NTRU
cryptosystem has not been really attacked on its double-circulant structure, indeed the best-
known attacks rely on general LLL (named after their incentors Lenstra–Lenstra–Lovász)
decoding algorithms for lattices.
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In a classical cryptographic Hamming context, the second author [18] introduced in 2005
the idea of using quasi-cyclic codes to decrease the size of the public key. However, adding
quasi-cyclicity to an already structured family of codes introduces too much structure and
the system was broken [37]. This idea was then used with other families of quasi-cyclic (or
quasi-dyadic) structured codes like Goppa quasi-dyadic [34] or quasi-cyclic alternant codes
[7]: these systems lead to much smaller keys, but eventually they were attacked in [13]
and even though the idea remains valid, the cryptanalysis of [13] showed that the idea of
quasi-cyclic or quasi-dyadic structured codes could not lead to secure public keys of a few
thousand bits, but rather to secure keys of a few tens of thousand bits.
More recently new proposals were made in the spirit of the original NTRU schemes with
Hamming distance, first relying on quasi-cyclic LDPC codes [5, 4, 3], then with MDPC codes
in [35]. The latter family of codes enables one to obtain the same type of feature as the
NTRU cryptosystem: a compact key and a security based on decoding with a random dual
matrix with small weights.
Contributions of the paper. The present paper introduces Low Rank Parity Check
codes and is an extended version of [20], with important new contributions. We propose an
improved decoder based on a new approach which allows for decoding of errors of higher
rank weight, namely up to 2
3
(n− k) when the previous decoding algorithm only performed
at rank weight n−k
2
. Our codes outperform the classical Gabidulin code decoder which
deals with weights up to n−k
2
. This comes at the expense of probabilistic decoding, but the
decoding error probability can be made arbitrarily small. For most of our proposed decoding
algorithms we give a precise analysis of the decoding failure probability: for some situations
the algorithm is iterative, in which case we only give an upper bound on the decoding
error probability together with simulations which show that these bounds are attained in
practice. The new approach can also be used to decrease the decoding error probability,
which is especially useful for cryptography. Finally, we introduce double-circulant ideal
rank codes, which generalize double-circulant rank codes. We propose different parameter
sizes, of the order of 1 kilobit for the key size and cipher text.
Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls ba-
sic facts about the rank metric and the corresponding difficult problems, Section 3 proves
technical results that are used for decoding, Section 4 recalls the definition of LRPC codes
and their basic decoding, Section 5 introduces a new general approach for improved de-
coding of LRPC codes, finally Section 6 is concerned with cryptography, we give our key
exchange and public key exchange schemes, with a security reduction to general problems
and parameters.
2 Background on Rank Metric Codes
2.1 General definitions
Notation:
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Let Fq denote the finite field of q elements where q is the power of a prime and let Fqm
denote the field of qm elements seen as the extension of degree m of Fq.
Fqm is also an Fq vector space of dimension m, we denote by capital letters the Fq-
subspaces of Fqm and by lower-case letters the elements of Fqm .
Let X ⊂ Fqm . We denote by 〈X〉 the Fq-subspace generated by the elements of X:
〈X〉 =
∑
x∈X
xFq.
If X = {x1, . . . , xn}, we simply use the notation 〈x1, . . . , xn〉.
Vectors are denoted by bold lower-case letters and matrices by bold capital letters (eg
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnqm and M = (mij)16i6k
16j6n
∈ Fk×nqm ).
If S is a finite set, we denote by x $← S the fact that x is chosen uniformly at random
amongst S.
Definition 2.1 (Rank metric over Fnqm). Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnqm and let (b1, . . . , bm) ∈
Fmqm be a basis of Fqm over Fq. Each coordinate xj is associated to a vector of Fmq in this
basis: xj =
∑m
i=1mijbi. The m× n matrix associated to x is given by M (x) = (mij)16i6m
16j6n
.
The rank weight ‖x‖ of x is defined as
‖x‖ def= RankM (x).
This definition does not depend on the choice of the basis. The associated distance d(x,y)
between elements x and y in Fnqm is defined by d(x,y) = ‖x− y‖.
Definition 2.2 (Fqm-linear code). An Fqm-linear code C of dimension k and length n is a
subspace of dimension k of Fnqm seen as a rank metric space. The notation [n, k]qm is used
to denote its parameters.
The code C can be represented by two equivalent ways:
• by a generator matrix G ∈ Fk×nqm . Each rows of G is an element of a basis of C,
C = {xG,x ∈ Fkqm}.
• by a parity-check matrix H ∈ F(n−k)×nqm . Each row of H determines a parity-check
equation verified by the elements of C:
C = {x ∈ Fnqm :HxT = 0}.
We say that G (respectively H) is under systematic form if and only if it is of the form
(Ik|A) (respectively (B|In−k)).
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Definition 2.3 (Support of a word). Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnqm. The support E of x,
denoted Supp(x), is the Fq-subspace of Fqm generated by the coordinates of x:
E = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉Fq
and we have dimE = ‖x‖.
The number of supports of dimension w of Fqm is given by the Gaussian coefficient[
m
w
]
q
=
w−1∏
i=0
qm − qi
qw − qi .
2.2 Double circulant and ideal codes
To describe an [n, k]qm linear code, we can give a systematic generator matrix or a systematic
parity-check matrix. In both cases, the number of bits needed to represent such a matrix
is k(n− k)m dlog2 qe. To reduce the size of a representation of a code, we introduce double
circulant codes.
First we need to define circulant matrices.
Definition 2.4 (Circulant matrix). A square matrixM of size n×n is said to be circulant
if it is of the form
M =

m0 m1 . . . mn−1
mn−1 m0
. . . mn−2
... . . . . . .
...
m1 m2 . . . m0
 .
We denoteMn(Fqm) the set of circulant matrices of size n× n over Fqm.
Relation between cyclic matrix form and polynomial form The following propo-
sition states an important property of circulant matrices.
Proposition 2.5. Mn(Fqm) is an Fqm-algebra isomorphic to Fqm [X]/(Xn − 1), that-is-to-
say the set of polynomials with coefficients in Fqm modulo Xn − 1. The canonical isomor-
phism is given by
ϕ : Fqm [X]/(Xn − 1) −→ Mn(Fqm)
n−1∑
i=0
miX
i 7−→

m0 m1 . . . mn−1
mn−1 m0
. . . mn−2
... . . . . . .
...
m1 m2 . . . m0

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In the following, in order to simplify notation, we will identify the polynomial G(X) =∑n−1
i=0 giX
i ∈ Fqm [X] with the vector g = (g0, . . . , gn−1) ∈ Fnqm . We will denote ug mod P
the vector of the coefficients of the polynomial
(∑n−1
j=0 ujX
j
) (∑n−1
i=0 giX
i
)
mod P or sim-
ply ug if there is no ambiguity in the choice of the polynomial P .
Definition 2.6 (Double circulant codes). A [2n, n]qm linear code C is said to be double
circulant if it has a generator matrix G of the form G = (A|B) where A and B are two
circulant matrices of size n, and the matrix A is invertible.
With the previous notation, we have C = {(xa,xb),x ∈ Fnqm}. Since a is invertible in
Fqm [X]/(Xn− 1), then C = {(x,xg),x ∈ Fnqm} where g = a−1b. In this case we say that C
is generated by g (mod Xn−1). Thus we only need nm dlog2 qe bits to describe a [2n, n]qm
double circulant code.
We can generalize double circulant codes by choosing another polynomial P to define
the quotient-ring Fqm [X]/(P ). This family of codes was defined in [31].
Definition 2.7 (Ideal codes). Let P (X) ∈ Fq[X] be a polynomial of degree n and g1, g2 ∈
Fnqm. Let G1(X) =
∑n−1
i=0 g1iX
i and G2(X) =
∑n−1
j=0 g2jX
j be the polynomials associated
respectively to g1 and g2.
We call the [2n, n]qm ideal code C of generator (g1, g2) the code with generator matrix
G =

G1(X) mod P G2(X) mod P
XG1(X) mod P XG2(X) mod P
...
...
Xn−1G1(X) mod P Xn−1G2(X) mod P
 .
More concisely, we have C = {(xg1 mod P,xg2 mod P ),x ∈ Fnqm}. We will often omit
mentioning the polynomial P if there is no ambiguity.
We usually require g1 to be invertible, in which case the code admits the systematic form,
C = {(x,xg),x ∈ Fnqm} with g = g−11 g2 mod P .
We need to be careful when we use these notations in the case of parity-check matrices.
Indeed, if we have a syndrome σ = e1h1+e2h2 mod P , this equality is equivalent in terms
of product matrix-vectors to (H1|H2)(e1|e2)T = σT where
H1 =

h1 mod P
Xh1 mod P
...
Xn−1h1 mod P

T
and H2 =

h2 mod P
Xh2 mod P
...
Xn−1h2 mod P

T
.
Thus, we say that (h1,h2) and P define a parity-check matrix of a code C if (HT1 |HT2 )
is a parity-check matrix of C.
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2.3 Difficult problems in rank metric
In this section, we introduce some difficult problems on which our cryptosystems are based.
Problem 2.8 (Rank Syndrome Decoding). Given a full-rank matrix H ∈ F(n−k)×nqm , a
syndrome σ and a weight w, it is hard to find a vector x ∈ Fnqm of weight lower than w such
that HxT = σT .
In [22] it is proven that the Syndrome Decoding problem in the Hamming metric, which is
a well-known NP-Hard problem, is probabilistically reduced to the RSD problem. Moreover,
the RSD problem can be seen as a structured version of the NP-Hard MinRank problem,
indeed the MinRank problem is equivalent to the RSD problem for Fq-linear codes.
This problem has an equivalent dual version. Let H be a parity-check matrix of a code
C and G be a generator matrix. The RSD problem is equivalent to finding m ∈ Fkqm and
x ∈ Fnqm such that mG+ x = y with y of weight r and y a pre-image of s by H . We can
now introduce the decisional version of this problem.
Problem 2.9 (Decisional Rank Syndrome Decoding). Given a full-rank matrix G ∈ Fk×nqm ,
a message m ∈ Fnqm and e ∈ Fnqm of weight r, it is hard to distinguish the pair (G,mG+x)
from (G,y) with y $← Fnqm.
We introduce the I− RSD (Ideal-Rank Syndrome Decoding) problem for ideal codes
defined in Definition 2.7 as well as an associated problem, I− RSR (Ideal-Rank Support
Recovery), and then show that these two problems are equivalent.
Problem 2.10 (Ideal-Rank Syndrome Decoding). Given a vector h ∈ Fnqm, a polynomial
P ∈ Fq[X] of degree n, a syndrome σ and a weight w, it is hard to sample a vector
x = (x1,x2) ∈ F2nqm of weight lower than w such that x1 + x2h = σ mod P .
Since h and P define a systematic parity-check matrix of a [2n, n]qm ideal code, the
I− RSD problem is a particular case of the RSD problem. Although this problem is the-
oretically easier than RSD problem, in practice the best algorithms for solving both these
problems are the same.
Problem 2.11 (Ideal-Rank Support Recovery). Given a vector h ∈ Fnqm, a polynomial
P ∈ Fq[X] of degree n, a syndrome σ and a weight w, it is hard to recover the support E of
dimension lower than w such that e1 + e2h = σ mod P where the vectors e1 and e2 were
sampled from E.
Equivalence between the I− RSD and I− RSR problems The I− RSR problem is
trivially reduced to the I− RSD problem. Indeed to recover the support E of an instance
of the I− RSD problem from a solution x of the I− RSD problem, we just have to compute
the support of x.
Conversely, the I− RSD problem can also be reduced to the I− RSR problem. Let us
suppose we know the support E of a solution of the I− RSR problem for a weight w. We
want to find x = (x1,x2) of weight lower than w such that x1 + x2h = σ mod P .
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This equation is equivalent to In H
 (x1,0 . . . x1,n−1, x2,0 . . . x2,n−1)T = σT (1)
where H =

h
Xh mod P
...
Xn−1h mod P

T
and x1 = (x10 . . . x1,n−1),x2 = (x20 . . . x2,n−1).
Let (E1, . . . , Ew) be a basis of E. We can express the coordinates of x1 and x2 in this
basis:
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, 0 6 j 6 n− 1, xij =
w∑
k=1
λijkEk, with λijk ∈ Fq.
Then we rewrite the equations (1) in the new unknowns λijk. We obtain a system of 2nw
unknowns over Fq and n equations over Fqm , so nm equations over Fq.
Since e1 + e2h = σ mod P , the system has at least one solution and by construction
all the solutions have their support included in E of dimension w, so we can find a solution
to the I− RSD problem by solving this system.
3 Some results on the product of two subspaces
Before introducing the decoding algorithm of LRPC codes, we need to introduce some
results on the product of two subspaces.
Definition 3.1. Let A and B be two Fq-subspaces of Fqm: we call the product space of A
and B, and denote it by AB, the Fq-linear span of the set of products {ab, a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
If A and B have dimensions α and β, and are generated respectively by {a1, · · · , aα}
and {b1, · · · , bβ}, then the product space AB is obviously generated by the set {aibj, 1 6
i 6 α, 1 6 j 6 β} and its dimension is therefore bounded above by αβ.
A question of interest that concerns us is the probability that the dimension is not
maximal when α and β are relatively small. Let A and B be random Fq-subspaces of Fqm
of dimensions α and β respectively. We suppose αβ < m and we investigate the typical
dimension of the subspace AB.
We rely on the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2. Let A′ and B be two subspaces of Fqm of dimensions α′ and β such that
dimA′B = α′β. Let A = A′ + 〈a〉 where a is a uniformly chosen random element of Fqm.
Then
Prob (dim(AB) < α′β + β) ≤ q
α′β+β
qm
.
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Proof. We have dim(AB) < α′β+β if and only if the subspace aB has a non-zero intersec-
tion with A′B. Now,
Prob (dim(A′B ∩ aB) 6= {0}) ≤
∑
b∈B,b 6=0
Prob (ab ∈ A′B)
≤ (|B| − 1)q
α′β
qm
since for any fixed a 6= 0, we have that ab is uniformly distributed in Fqm . Writing |B|−1 ≤
|B| = qβ we have the result.
Proposition 3.3. Let B be a fixed subspace and suppose we construct a random subspace A
by choosing uniformly at random α independent vectors of Fqm and letting A be the subspace
generated by these α random vectors. We have that dimAB = αβ with probability at least
1− α qαβ
qm
.
Proof. Apply the Lemma α times, starting with a random subspace A′ ⊂ A of dimension 1,
and adding a new element to A′ until we obtain A.
In practice, our tests shows that the probability that dimAB = rd is slightly larger than
the probability that rd elements of Fqm chosen uniformly at random generate a subspace
of dimension rd. This difference becomes rapidly negligible, even for small value such as
α = 3, β = 4,m = 20.
Let B be a fixed subspace of Fqm containing 1 and let B2 be the subspace generated by
all products of two, possibly equal, elements of B. Let β2 = dimB2. Let A be a random
subspace of Fqm of dimension α. By Proposition 3.3 we have that dim(AB2) = αβ2 with
probability at least 1− α qαβ2
qm
.
Remark: we have β2 6 β(β + 1)/2.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose dim(AB2) = αβ2. Let e ∈ AB with e 6∈ A. Suppose eB ⊂ AB.
Then there exists x ∈ B, x 6∈ Fq, such that xB ⊂ B.
Proof. Let (ai) be a basis of A. We have
e =
∑
i
λiaibi
with λi ∈ Fq for all i and bj /∈ Fq and λj 6= 0 for some j, otherwise e ∈ A contrary to our
assumption. Let b be any element of B. By our hypothesis we have eb ∈ AB, meaning
there exist µj ∈ Fq such that ∑
i
λiaibib =
∑
j
µjajb
′
j
with b′i ∈ B. Now the maximality of the dimension of AB2 implies that
λjajbjb = µjajb
′
j
from which we deduce bjb ∈ B. Since this holds for arbitrary b ∈ B, we have bjB ⊂ B.
9
Proposition 3.5. Suppose m is prime. Let A and B be random subspaces of dimensions α
and β respectively. Let (bi) be a basis of B and let S = AB. Then with probability at least
1− α qαβ(β+1)/2
qm
we have that
⋂
i b
−1
i S = A.
Proof. If not, there exists a subspace E ) A, such that EB = AB. By the remark before
Lemma 3.4 we have that with probability at least
1− αq
αβ(β+1)/2
qm
the conditions of Lemma 3.4 hold. But then there is x 6∈ Fq such that xB ⊂ B. But this
implies that Fq(x)B ⊂ B. But m prime implies that there is no intermediate field between
Fq and Fqm , hence Fqm ⊂ B, a contradiction.
A better bound Our goal is to show that with a large probability, when A and B are
randomly chosen with sufficiently small dimension, then with probability close to 1 we have
that : ⋂
b∈B,b 6=0
b−1AB = A.
Without loss of generality we can suppose that 1 ∈ B. We shall show that for a random
b ∈ B, we have that b 6= 0 and
AB ∩ b−1AB = A
with probability close to 1.
When b is a random element of Fqm we will abuse notation somewhat by letting b−1
denote the inverse of b when b 6= 0 and by letting it equal 0 when b = 0. With this
convention in mind we have:
Lemma 3.6. Let B1 be a subspace of dimension β1. Let b be a uniformly distributed random
element of Fqm. Then the probability that b ∈ B1 + b−1B1 is at most:
2q2β1
qm
.
Proof. This event can only happen if b is a root of an equation of the form
x2 − b1x− b′1 = 0.
There are at most |B1|2 = q2β1 such equations, and each one of them has at most two
roots.
Let B1 be any vector space containing 1 and of dimension β1. Let b be a random
element uniformly distributed in Fqm and set B = B1 + 〈b〉. Denote β = dimB = β1 + 1
(with probability 1 − qβ1/qm). Since b−1 is also uniformly distributed, so is b−1b1 for any
b1 ∈ B1, b1 6= 0. Therefore, for any such b1, the probability that b−1b1 ∈ B1 equals |B1|/qm.
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By the union bound, the union of these events, over all b1 ∈ B1 \ {0}, has probability at
most (|B1| − 1)|B1|/qm. We have therefore that either b = 0 or B1 ∩ b−1B1 6= {0} with
probability at most
(|B1| − 1) |B1|
qm
≤ q
2β1
qm
.
Therefore with probability at least
1− q
2β1
qm
we have that b 6= 0 and
dim(B1 + b
−1B1) = 2β1.
Now applying Lemma 3.6 we obtain:
Lemma 3.7. With probability at least
1− 3q
2β1
qm
we have that
dim(B + b−1B) = 2β − 1.
Proposition 3.8. Let B be a subspace of dimension β containing 1 such that dimB +
b−1B = 2β−1 for some b ∈ B. Let A be a randomly chosen subspace of dimension α. With
probability at least 1− α qα(2β−1)
qm
we have that AB ∩ b−1AB = A
Proof. By Proposition 3.3 we have that with probability at least
1− αq
α(2β−1)
qm
dim[A(B + b−1B)] = α(2β − 1) = 2αβ − α.
On the other hand, we have that
dimA(B + b−1B) = dimAB + dim b−1AB − dim(AB ∩ b−1AB)
= 2αβ − dim(AB ∩ ABb−1)
hence
dim(AB ∩ b−1AB) = α.
But this proves the result since A ⊂ AB ∩ b−1AB and dimA = α.
Remark 3.9. It is interesting to remark that in practice the probabilities given in Propo-
sition 3.5 and 3.8 decrease much faster to 0. Indeed when the degree of the extension m
increases by one (for m greater than αβ), if we make the reasonable assumption that each
subspace of the form b−1i S behaves as a random subspace which contains A, the probability
that one intersection b−1i S∩b−1j S 6= A is divided by q, hence the probability that
⋂
i b
−1
i S 6= A
is divided by a factor at least qβ−1. This means that in practice the previous upper bound is
rather weak, and that one can consider that as soon as m is greater than αβ by 8 or more
(and increasing) the probability is far below 2−30. This will be the case when we choose
parameters in the last section.
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4 LRPC codes and their basic decoding
4.1 Low Rank Parity Check codes
LRPC codes were introduced in [20]. They are good candidates for the McEliece cryptosys-
tem of because the have a weak algebraic structure.
Definition 4.1 (LRPC codes). Let H = (hij)16i6n−k
16j6n
∈ F(n−k)×nqm be a full-rank matrix such
that its coefficients generate an Fq-subspace F of small dimension d:
F = 〈hij〉Fq .
Let C be the code with parity-check matrix H. By definition, C is an [n, k]qm LRPC code of
dual weight d. Such a matrix H is called a homogeneous matrix of weight d and support F .
We can now define ideal LRPC codes similarly to our definition of ideal codes.
Definition 4.2 (Ideal LRPC codes). Let F be an Fq-subspace of dimension d of Fqm, let
(h1,h2) be two vectors of Fnqm of support F and let P ∈ Fq[X] be a polynomial of degree n.
Let
H1 =

h1
Xh1 mod P
...
Xn−1h1 mod P

T
and H2 =

y
Xh2 mod P
...
Xn−1h2 mod P

T
.
When the matrix H = (H1|H2) has rank n over Fqm, the code C with parity check matrix
H is called an ideal LRPC code of type [2n, n]qm.
As we can see, since P ∈ Fq[X], the support of X ih1 is still F for all 1 6 i 6 n−1 hence
the necessity to choose P with coefficients in the base field Fq to keep the LRPC structure
of the ideal code.
4.2 A basic decoding algorithm
The general idea of the algorithm is to use the fact that we know a parity-check matrix with
a small weight d that is to say that the Fq-subspace F of Fqm spanned by the coordinates
of this matrix has a small dimension of d, hence the subspace S = 〈s1, . . . , snk〉 generated
by the coordinates of syndrome enables one to recover the whole product space P = EF of
the support of the error and of the known small basis of H. Knowing the space P and the
space F enables one to recover E. Then, knowing the support E of the error e, it is easy to
recover the exact value of each coordinate by solving a linear system. This approach is very
similar to the classical decoding procedure of BCH codes for instance, where one recovers
the error-locator polynomial, which gives the support of the error, and then the value of
the error coordinates.
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Consider an [n, k]qm LRPC code C of low weight d, with generator matrix G and dual
(n − k) × n matrix H , such that all the coordinates hij of H belong to a space F of
dimension d with basis {f1, . . . , fd}.
Suppose the received word to be y = xG+e where e ∈ Fnqm is the error vector of rank r.
Let E = Supp(e) and let {e′1, . . . , e′r} be a basis of E.
We have the basic decoding algorithm described in Figure 1, which has a probability of
failure that we will consider in subsection 4.4.
Data: The vector y and the matrix H
Result: The message x
1. Syndrome space computation
Compute the syndrome vector Hyt = sT = (s1, . . . , sn−k)T
and the syndrome space S = 〈s1, · · · , sn−k〉.
2. Recovering the support E of the error
Define Si = f−1i S, the subspace where all generators of S
are multiplied by f−1i . Compute the support of the error
E = S1∩S2∩ · · · ∩Sd, and compute a basis {e′1, e′2, . . . , e′r} of
E.
3. Recovering the error vector e
Write each coordinate ei of e in the error support as ei =∑n
i=1 eije
′
j, solve the system HeT = sT , where the equa-
tions HeT = sT and the syndrome coordinates si are
written as elements of the product space EF in the basis
{f1e′1, · · · , f1e′r, · · · , fde′1, · · · , fde′r}. The system has nr un-
knowns (the eij) in Fq and (n− k)rd equations from the syn-
drome.
4. Recovering the message x
Recover x from the system xG = y − e.
Figure 1: A basic decoding algorithm for LRPC codes
4.3 Correctness of the algorithm
We prove the correctness of the algorithm in the ideal case when dimEF = rd, dimS = rd
and dimS1 ∩ S2 ∩ · · · ∩ Sd = r. We will see in the next subsection that this is the general
case.
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step 1: the first step of the algorithm is obvious.
step 2: now we want to prove that E ⊂ S1 ∩ S2 ∩ · · · ∩ Sd. We define Si = f−1i S =
{f−1i x, x ∈ S}. Since by hypothesis the space S is exactly the product space EF , we have
fie
′
j ∈ S,∀1 ≤ j ≤ r, hence e′j ∈ Si for all i, j. Therefore E ⊂ Si, hence E ⊂ S1∩S2∩· · ·∩Sd.
By hypothesis dimS1 ∩ S2 ∩ · · · ∩ Sd = dimE hence E = S1 ∩ S2 ∩ · · · ∩ Sd.
step 3: once the support E of the error e is known, one can write
ei =
∑
1≤j≤r
eije
′
j, with eij ∈ Fq
and solve the linear systemHeT = sT in the nr unknowns eij. The system has nr unknowns
in Fq and (n−k)rd equations in Fq coming from the n−k syndrome equations in EF . The
parameter d is chosen such that d ≥ n
n−k .
4.4 Probability of failure
We now consider the different possibilities of failure, there are three cases to consider.
The case dimEF = rd corresponds to proposition 3.3, the case E = S1 ∩ S2 ∩ · · · ∩ Sd
corresponds to proposition 3.5. In both cases the probability can be made exponentially
small depending on the parameters, especially when in practice the upper bound given are
really large compared to experimental results.
The last case is the case dimS = rd. We have the following easy proposition:
Proposition 4.3. The probability that the n− k syndrome coordinates do not generate the
product space EF is less than qrd−(n−k).
Proof. By construction all si belong to the product space EF and since the error is taken
randomly and the matrix H is full-rank, the si can be seen as random elements of EF .
Now if one considers a set of (n − k) random elements in a space of dimension rd (with
n− k ≥ rd) the probability that this set does not generate the whole space is equal to the
probability that a random [rd, n−k] matrix over Fq is not full-rank, which is not more than
q(n−k)−rd according to the lemma below.
Lemma 4.4. Let a, x be integers and let A be a uniform random a× (a + x) matrix over
Fq. The probability that A has rank less than a is bounded from above by q−x.
Proof. Proceed by induction on a. When a = 1, the probability thatA is not full-rank is the
probability that its unique random row equals the zero row, which is equal to q−(x+1) < q−x.
Let now a > 1 and suppose the result proved for matrices with a− 1 rows. The probability
of A not being full-rank is, by the law of total probability, not more than
P1 + P2
where P1 is the probability that A is not full-rank, conditional on its first a− 1 rows being
full-rank, and where P2 is the probability that the first a − 1 rows of A are not full-rank.
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we have P1 ≤ qa−1/qa+x = 1/qx+1 and P2 ≤ q−x−1 by the induction hypothesis. Hence the
probability of A not being full-rank is at most 2q−x−1 ≤ q−x.
The previous discussion shows that depending on the parameters the probability of
failure of the previous algorithm can be made arbitrarily small and that the main probability
we have to consider in fact is the probability given by Proposition 4.3, which is not an upper
bound but what happens in practice.
4.5 Computational cost of decoding
The most costly step of the algorithm are step 2) and step 3). The cost of step 2) is the
cost of the intersection of vector spaces which has cost 4r2d2m operations in the base field
(this operation can also be done in a very elegant way with q-polynomials [36]). Now the
cost of step 3) is the cost of solving the system HeT = sT when the support E of the error
is known. If one proceeds naively there are nr unknowns (the eij) and the cost of matrix
inversion is n3r3, but one can use a precomputation to perform this step in n2r operations.
To solve the linear system in n2r operations, we introduce the matrix ArH , which cor-
responds to the matrix H "unfolded" over Fq and represents the system HeT = sT .
We want to solve the following system :

h11 h12 · · · h1n
h21
. . . ...
... . . .
...
h(n−k)1 · · · · · · h(n−k)n


e1
e2
...
en
=

s1
s2
...
sn−k
 (2)
Suppose dimEF is exactly rd. Then we can unfold each si in the basis (fie′j)16i6d
16j6r
. Now
if we unfold each hij in the basis (fu)16u6d : hij =
d∑
u=1
hijufu, hiju ∈ Fq and each ej in the
basis (e′v)16j6r : ej =
r∑
v=1
ejve
′
v, ejv ∈ Fq, we get the following relation:
si =
n∑
j=1
hije
′
j =
n∑
j=1
d∑
u=1
r∑
v=1
hijuejvfue
′
v.
Each of these relations can be viewed as a linear system with nr unknowns (the eij) and
rd equations from the syndrome in Fq :
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
h111 0 0 h121 0 0 h1n1 0 0
0
. . . 0 0 . . . 0 · · · 0 . . . 0
0 0 h111 0 0 h121 0 0 h1n1
h112 0 0 h122 0 0 h1n2 0 0
0
. . . 0 0 . . . 0 · · · 0 . . . 0
0 0 h112 0 0 h122 0 0 h1n2
...
...
...
h11d 0 0 h12d 0 0 h1nd 0 0
0
. . . 0 0 . . . 0 · · · 0 . . . 0
0 0 h11d 0 0 h12d 0 0 h1nd


e11
e21
...
e1r
e21
...
e2r
...
en1
...
enr

=

s111
...
s1d1
s112
...
s1d2
...
s11r
...
s1dr

(3)
Where s1uv =
∑
j
h1juejv (the syndrome coordinates unfolded in the basis of EF ). Each
h1ju is expanded into an r × r diagonal matrix whose coefficients are equal to h1ju. By
repeating this process for each si, we obtain a linear system with nr unknowns and (n−k)rd
equations in Fq. We call the matrix representing this system ArH . The first line of ArH , for
example, represents the impact of the error vector e on the first line of H relative to the
element F1E1 of the basis of EF .
Denote AH an invertible submatrix of ArH and DH = A
−1
H . Then solving the linear
system consists only of multiplying nr syndrome coordinates by an nr× nr DH instead of
inverting it.
Since AH is a nr×nr matrix, it can be chosen such that it only contains r× r diagonal
matrices. AH and DH can therefore be stored in memory as n2 elements of Fq, and can
be inverted in n3 operations in Fq instead of n3r3 operations. Using this representation,
we can see that the multiplication DH .s takes only n2r multiplications in Fq since each
row of the condensed matrix contributes to r error coordinates, hence the complexity. This
complexity can also be attained with the full nr × nr matrix by taking into account the
fact that it is composed of multiple r × r diagonal matrices.
5 Improved decoding : syndrome space expansion algo-
rithm
In general, the basic decoding algorithm presented in Section 4 does not work when the
syndrome space S = 〈s1, ..., sn−k〉 is different from EF . In this section, we present an
algorithm that can be used between steps 1) and 2) of the basic decoding algorithm to
recover EF in certain cases when dimS < dimEF . We denote by c the codimension of S
in EF , that is to say c = dimEF − dimS.
In this section, we will always suppose that dimEF = rd for two reasons:
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• first, according to Proposition 3.3, the probability p1 that dimEF < rd can easily be
exponentially low by increasing m. We can also decrease the probability p2 that S 6=
EF by increasing n, however for cryptographic applications of LRPC, the parameters
of the code are such that p1 is negligible with respect to p2.
• secondly, the case dimEF = rd is the worst case for the decoding since the probability
that S = EF increases when the dimension of EF decreases. Thus, we can analyze
the theoretical probability of failure in the worst case scenario. All the tests we have
made show that in practice the probability of failure is smaller when dimS < rd,
which confirms our analysis.
5.1 General idea
This algorithm’s aim is to recover vectors of the product space EF which do not belong to
the syndrome space S by using the structure of the product space EF = 〈f1e1, f2e1, ..., fder〉
and the fact that we know a basis 〈f1, ..., fd〉 of F . We use a function which take on input the
subspace S and outputs a subspace S ′ such that S  S ′ ⊂ EF with a very high probability,
depending on the parameters of the code. We call such a function an “expansion function”.
Here are two examples of expansion functions:
1. fdecode(S) = (S + fiSj) ∩ (S + fkSl) is used to decode errors of larger weight.
2. fprob(S) = S + FSij, where Sij = Si ∩ Sj, is used to reduce the decoding failure rate.
We use these expansion functions to describe an iterative algorithm [2]. Detailed algo-
rithms for each function are given in the next subsections.
Data: The syndrome space S and the vector space F
Result: The expanded syndrome space S ′, which may be EF , or
failure
1. Expand S with the expansion function
Use the expansion function for all possible parameters:
S ← fexpand(S)
2. Iterative step
If dimS = rd, then return S. If dimS < rd, go back to step 1.
If dimS does not increase during step 1, return failure.
Figure 2: The syndrome space expansion algorithm
Proposition 5.1. dim(Si ∩ E) > r − c, with c = dimEF − dimS.
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Proof. We have dimSi = dimS = rd− c and
dim(E + Si) = dim fi(E + Si) = dim(fiE + S)
6 dimEF = rd (4)
since fiE and S are subspaces of EF . Hence:
dim(Si ∩ E) = dimE + dimSi − dim(E + Si)
> r + rd− c − rd
> r − c.
As we will see in the next subsections, each expansion function has advantages and
drawbacks, and the choice of which function to use depends on the parameters. In partic-
ular, m needs to be high enough for these functions to work. The function fdecode needs
m ≥ 3rd − 2 and allows to decode errors of weight up to 2
3
(n − k) whereas the function
fprob only needs m ≥ 2rd− r. In this case we can only decode errors of weight up to (n−k)2
but by strongly reducing the decoding failure probability. In particular, this latter case
corresponds to parameters used for cryptography, where rd ≈ (n− k) = n
2
and m ≈ n.
5.2 Increasing the weight of the decoded error vectors
In this subsection we explain in details the function fdecode:
fdecode : S 7→ (S + fiSj) ∩ (S + fkSl).
The idea is that each subspace of the form (S + fiSj) has a chance to contain vectors x
such that x ∈ EF and x /∈ S, since EF ∩ fiSj 6= {0}. If we find some new vectors of EF
but not the whole product space, we can reuse values of (i, j, k, l) already tested because
they may lead us to recover some new vectors thanks to the one we have added. Hence
the algorithm functions in an iterative way. If during a whole iteration, the dimension of S
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does not increase, then the algorithm will fail.
Algorithm 1: Syndrome space expansion using fdecode
Input: The syndrome space S and the vector space F
Output: The expanded syndrome space S ′, which may be EF , or failure
1 begin
2 while true do
3 tmp← dimS ;
4 for Every (i, j, k, l) such that i 6= j, k 6= l and (i, j) 6= (k, l) do
5 S ← (S + fi.Sj) ∩ (S + fk.Sl) ;
6 end
7 if dimS = rd then
8 return S ;
9 end
10 if dimS = tmp then
11 return failure ;
12 end
13 end
14 end
Maximum weight of the decoded errors. Without using the syndrome space expan-
sion algorithm, the decoding algorithm for LRPC codes can decode up to r = n−k
d
errors.
We can use fdecode to deal with error vectors of increased weight.
Theorem 5.2. For d = 2, under the assumption that dim(Si ∩ E) = r − c for 1 6 i 6 2,
fdecode allows to decode errors of weight up to r 6
⌊
2
3
(n− k)⌋ with probability ≈ 1− q3r−2(n−k)
q−1
for the general case and errors of weight up to r = 2
3
(n− k) with probability ≈ 0.29 for the
case q = 2.
Proof. d = 2 =⇒ dimEF = 2r.
Thus, the dimension of EF + f1f−12 EF is at most 3r for f1E ⊂ EF ∩ f1f−12 EF . The only
expansion that can be done is S ← (S+ f1f−12 S)∩ (S+ f2f−11 S), hence there is no iterative
effect.
Since (S + f1f−12 S) = f1f
−1
2 (S + f2f
−1
1 S), the dimension of these two vectors spaces is
the same. If dim(S+f1f−12 S) < 3r, then it is impossible to find the whole space EF , which
leads to a decoding failure. Since the dimension of S is at most n − k, the dimension of
S + fif
−1
j S is at most 2(n− k), which implies 3r 6 2(n− k). Hence r 6
⌊
2
3
(n− k)⌋.
Considering that S and f1f−12 S are independent, the probability of success is the prob-
ability that the sum of two subspaces of dimension n− k of EF + f1f−12 EF generates the
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whole space. So we have:
psuccess = Prob(S + f1f
−1
2 S = EF + f1f
−1
2 EF )
= Prob(dim(S + f1f
−1
2 S) = 3r)
= Prob(2(n− k)− dimS ∩ (f1f−12 S) = 3r)
= Prob(dimS ∩ (f1f−12 S) = 2(n− k)− 3r).
The formula for computing this probability can be found in [24] (Proposition 3.2). We
obtain:
psuccess =
[
n− k
2(n− k)− 3r
]
q
q(3r−(n−k))
2
[
3r
n− k
]
q
=
[
n− k
3r − (n− k)
]
q
q(3r−(n−k))
2
[
3r
3r − (n− k)
]
q
. (5)
By applying the series expansion for Pa,b(n) (Appendix A,page 45) with n = 3r, a = b =
3r − (n− k), we obtain:
psuccess ≈ 1− q
−3r(q3r−(n−k) − 1)2
q − 1
≈ 1− q
3r−2(n−k)
q − 1 .
In the case q = 2 and 3r = 2(n − k), this approximation is incorrect. According to
Equation (5),
psuccess =
[
n− k
n− k
]
2
2(n−k)
2
[
3r
n− k
]
2
=
2(n−k)
2[
2(n− k)
n− k
]
2
−→ 0.29 when (n− k)→∞ (the convergence is very fast).
In figure 3, we present simulation results comparing the observed probability of failure
and q−1.
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Figure 3: Results for d = 2, n = 30, k = 15, r = 10. We can observe the success rate of
≈ 0.29 for q = 2.
Proposition 5.3. Under the assumption that dim(Si ∩ E) = r − c for 1 6 i 6 d, fdecode
allows to decode errors up to r 6 n−k
d−1 for d > 2, using the fact that the algorithm functions
in an iterative way.
Proof. For d > 2, the algorithm may recover EF as long as c < r (i.e there are vectors
of E in Si) using the iterative effect, so the algorithm does not have to recover the whole
product space at a time : if it recovers one new vector then it can be added to S and used
with different values of (i, j, k, l) (even those that have already been used) to produce more
vectors, hence the only condition for that method to work is c < r in order to have vectors
of E in Si.
If the n− k syndrome vectors are independent, then c is rd− (n− k), which gives the
result:
c < r ⇔ rd− (n− k) < r
⇔ r(d− 1) < n− k
⇔ r < n− k
d− 1 .
Although giving a theorical probability of failure is difficult in this case since there is
an iterative effect, simulations show that in practice we attain this bound.
Minimal value of m
Proposition 5.4. fdecode recovers new vectors of EF only if m > 3rd− 2
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Proof. To produce vectors of EF , we compute vector spaces of the form fif−1j S. If we
suppose that f−1j S contains exactly r− c independent vectors of E, which is the worst case,
then we get r − c vectors of EF and r(d− 1) + c random vectors in S ′ij = fif−1j S.
By adding this vector space to S, the dimension cannot exceed rd + r(d − 1) + c =
2rd− r + c i.e the dimension of EF along with the random vectors in S ′ij.
The intersection between S ′ij and S ′kl needs to remove all the random vectors in order
to recover vectors that are ∈ EF , whence:
dim(S ′ij) + dim(S
′
kl) 6 m+ dim(S ′ij ∩ S ′kl)⇔ 2(2rd− r + c) 6 m+ rd
⇔ m > 4rd− 2r + 2c− rd
⇔ m > 3rd− 2r + 2c.
Since c can not be higher than r − 1 (there would be no vectors of E in f−1j S), the
inequality becomes m > 3rd− 2.
The value of m needed by this expansion function is pretty high and does not fit the
parameters used for cryptography. However, it works for d = 2, which is not the case of
fprob studied in the next subsection.
5.3 Reducing the decryption failure rate
5.3.1 Description of the algorithm
In this subsection we will study fprob in a more detailed way.
fprob : S 7→ S + FSij.
This function fits the parameters used for cryptography and is used to reduce the decoding
failure rate. It uses the fact that Sij = Si ∩ Sj contains at least r− 2c independent vectors
of E (see Proposition 5.5) and is a subspace of E with a very high probability when m is
large enough. Thus, the subspace FSij has a chance to contain a vector x ∈ EF and x /∈ S.
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Algorithm 2: Syndrome space expansion using fprob
Input: The syndrome space S and the vector space F
Output: The expanded syndrome space S ′, which may be EF , or failure
1 begin
2 while true do
3 tmp← dimS ;
4 for Every (i, j) such that i 6= j do
5 S ← S + FSij ;
6 end
7 if dimS = rd then
8 return S ;
9 end
10 if dimS = tmp then
11 return failure ;
12 end
13 end
14 end
Proposition 5.5. dim(Sij ∩ E) > r − 2c for all i, j ∈ [1..d], with c = dimEF − dimS.
Proof. Using Proposition 5.1, a simple computation gives us the result:
dim(Sij ∩ E) = dim(Si ∩ Sj ∩ E)
= dim(Si ∩ E) + dim(Sj ∩ E)− dim
(
(Si ∩ E) + (Sj ∩ E)
)
> 2(r − c)− r
> r − 2c.
Theorem 5.6. Let Prob(c = l) be the probability that dimEF − dimS = l and let
Probc=l(failure) be the probability that the syndrome space expansion algorithm does not
recover EF when c = l. Using the syndrome space expansion algorithm with fprob, the
probability of failure is :
Prob
(
c > r
2
)
+
b r2c−1∑
l=1
Prob(c = l)× Probc=l(failure).
Proof. The main source of decoding failures for the basic decoding algorithm is the fact
that the syndrome coordinates do not generate the whole product space EF , so we need to
compute the global probability of not recovering EF using fprob.
When c > r
2
, in general Sij is empty so the syndrome space expansion algorithm will
not recover EF , which leads to a failure.
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When c < r
2
, the probability that the syndrome space expansion algorithm recovers EF
is Probc=l(failure). We multiply this probability by the probability of c being equal to l
to get the overall probability of not recovering EF .
Proposition 5.7. Prob(c = l) ' q−l(n−k−rd+l)
Proof. The probability that the n − k syndrome coordinates generate a subspace of codi-
mension l of EF is the probability that a random (n−k)×rd matrix in Fq is of rank rd− l.
From [30], we have that St, the number of m× n matrix of rank t, is :
St =
t−1∏
j=0
(qn − qj)(qm − qj)
(qt − qj) .
We can approximate this formula by ignoring qj, which leads to :
St '
t−1∏
j=0
(qn)(qm)
(qt)
=
t−1∏
j=0
qn+m−t = qt(n+m−t).
From that, we deduce the number of (n− k)× rd matrices of rank rd− l :
q(rd−l)(n−k+rd−rd+l) = q(rd−l)(n−k+l).
By dividing this quantity by the total number of (n − k) × rd matrices, we get the
probability that a random matrix has rank rd− l :
q(rd−l)(n−k+l)
q(n−k)rd
= q(rd−l)(n−k+l)−(n−k)rd = qlrd−l(n−k)−l
2
= q−l(n−k−rd+l).
Hence the result.
5.3.2 Case of codimension 1
Before giving the probability of success of Algorithm 2, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 5.8. The dimension of Si ∩ E is :
• r with probability pr =
rd− 1
r

qrd
r

q
≈ q−r.
• r − 1 with probability 1− pr ≈ 1− q−r.
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Proof. We have: dimSi ∩ E = r ⇐⇒ E ⊂ Si ⇐⇒ fiE ⊂ S.
The space fiE is a subspace of dimension r of EF and S is a random subspace of dimension
rd− 1 of EF , hence
Prob(dim(Si ∩ E) = r) =
[
rd− 1
r
]
q[
rd
r
]
q
≈ q−r
which proves the first point. According to Proposition 5.1, dim(Si ∩ E) > r − 1 which
concludes the proof of this lemma.
We can now give the probability of success of the decoding algorithm in the case dimS =
dimEF − 1.
Theorem 5.9. Under the assumption Sij ⊂ E and dimS = dimEF − 1, the syndrome
space expansion algorithm using fprob recovers EF with probability at least 1− q(2−r)(d−2).
Proof. To find an upper bound on the probability of failure, we are going to focus on the
case where dim(Sij ∩ E) = r − 2. Indeed, Lemma 5.8 shows that the typical dimension of
Si ∩E is r− 1. Furthermore, when there exists i such that dim(Si ∩E) = r, the algorithm
has access to more vectors of E and so this leads to a smaller probability of failure. The
same thing goes for the case where there exists dim(Sij) = r − 1 instead of r − 2 which is
the expected size, so we can consider that dim(Sij) = r− 2 since this will lead to an upper
bound of the probability of failure.
We are now going to study the dimension of Sij +Sjk+Sik. There are two possibilities:
• If Sij = Sjk, then necessarily we have Sik = Sij = Sjk, because the r − 2 vectors of
Sij + Sjk are both in Si and Sk. This happens with probability q2−r : the probability
that two subspaces of dimension r − 2 (Sij and Sjk) of a vector space of dimension
r − 1 (Sj ∩ E) are equal.
• If Sij 6= Sjk, then we have Sik +Sij +Sjk = E : we know that Sik +Sij = Si ∩E, and
that Sjk 6⊂ Si (otherwise we would be in the first case). Hence Sik + Sij + Sjk = E.
If there exists a set {Si1j1 , . . . , Sinjn} such that their direct sum equals E, then the
algorithm will succeed since it will have added exactly EF to S at one point. If such a
set does not exist, then it means that every Sij are equal to each other. In particular,
every vector of E the algorithm as access to is ∈ S1, . . . ,∈ Sd, which means that when we
multiply this vector by F , the resulting vectors will already be in S and we will obtain no
information, causing the algorithm to fail.
The probability that all the Sij are equal is the probability of S12 = S23 = · · · = Sd−1,d.
Since d−2 equalities are needed, the probability of this happening is q(2−r)(d−2), which gives
the probability of failure.
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Impact of m on decoding. If the value of m is not high enough, then Sij will contain
not only vectors of E but also random vectors. When this happens, the Sij cannot be used
by the expansion algorithm because it would add random vectors to S.
Proposition 5.10. Let E be a subspace of Fqm of dimension r. Let F1 and F2 be two
subspaces of Fqm such that
• dimFi = di
• dim(E ∩ Fi) = r − ci
Then dim(F1 ∩ F2) > r − c1 − c2 and we have
Prob ((F1 ∩ F2) ⊂ E) >
[
m− d1 − c1
d2 − r + c2
]
q[
m− r
d2 − r + c2
]
q
q(d1−r+c1)(d2−r+c2).
If m > d1 + d2, we have Prob ((F1 ∩ F2) ⊂ E) > 1− q−m+r(qd1−r+c1−1)(qd2−r+c2−1)q−1 +O (q−2m)
when m→∞.
The proof of this proposition is given appendix A.
Corollary 5.11. Applying Proposition 5.10 with Fi = Si, dimSi = rd − 1 and ci = 1, we
obtain Prob ((Si ∩ Sj) ⊂ E) ≈ 1− q−m+2rd−rq−1 .
From corollary 5.11, we can see that adding 1 to the value ofm leads to a factor q−1 in the
probability of finding random vectors in Sij, thus this probability can be made arbitrarily
small.
To detect that Sij contains random vectors, we can keep track of the dimension of S
during the expansion. Indeed, if Sij contains random vectors, adding FSij to S will lead to
a dimension greater than rd. In this case we just need to discard the vectors we just added
and continue with the next Sij.
Comments on the small values of q When using small values of q, the cases where
dimSi ∩ E or dimSij > r − 2 are not so rare. Simulation for d = 3, r = 3 seems to show
that the probability q(2−r)(d−2) is accurate when q is high enough, but is a pessimistic bound
when q is small, especially when q = 2. Simulation results are shown in figure 4.
Proposition 5.12. For q = 2, the syndrome space expansion algorithm using fprob recovers
EF with probability at least 1− q(1−r)(d−2).
Proof. When q = 2, the probability that Sij = Sjk used in the proof above is not q2−r but
q1−r. Indeed, from Proposition 5.10, we get that the probability of Sij and Sjk being equal
is approximately q
−1
q−1 which is equal to q
−1 when q = 2.
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Figure 4: Simulation results for c = 1, d = 3, r = 3
This leads to a failure probability of q(1−r)(d−2). This is still not as good as what happens
in practice, since it does not take into account the fact that the algorithm often has more
than r − 2 vectors of E in each Sij to work with, but is a closer estimate in this special
case.
5.3.3 Case of codimension > 2
In the case c > 2, we have no theoretical analysis, but we can do simulations for particular
parameters to estimate the probability of failure. In practice we obtain good estimations
of the probability of failure. For example, for q = 2, c = 2, r = 5, d = 6 and m = 80, we
obtain a probability of failure of 2−14.
5.3.4 Upper bound on the decryption failure rate
• The codimension of S in EF is 1, but the algorithm fails to recover EF .
• The codimension of S in EF is greater than 1. Since it is difficult to give a theorical
bound on the probability, we will consider that decoding fails in that case:
q(2−r)(d−2) × q(n−k)−rd + q−2(n−k−rd+2).
5.4 Tradeoff between expansion functions
In the previous subsections we studied two expansion functions in detail:
• fdecode can decode higher values of r but needs a higher m (m ≥ 3rd− r)
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• fprob fits values of m (m ≥ 2rd− r) used in cryptography, but is less effective since it
decodes up to c < r
2
instead of c < r
Depending on the parameters, we can build new expansion functions: in general, the
higher m is, the better the expansion function will be. For example, if m is really high,
we can use this function: S ← (S + fiSj + fkSl) ∩ (S + faSb + fcSd) which is basically an
improvement of fdecode since it has a higher chance of recovering vectors of EF by adding
two fiSj at a time.
If m is lower than the one needed for fprob, one can use the function S ← S+F (Sij∩Sk)
which requires a lower m but can only decode with c < r
3
.
5.5 Rank Support Recovery algorithm
Algorithm 1 computes the error vector from the syndrome equations HeT = sT . However,
for cryptographic applications, we may just recover the support of the error and use it
as the shared secret since the I − RSR and I − RSD problems are equivalent. We use
the Rank Support Recovery (RSR) algorithm which is a shortened version of the decoding
algorithm 1 which does not compute the coordinates of the error, and uses fprob to reduce
the decoding failure rate.
Algorithm 3: the Rank Support Recovery algorithm
Input: A parity-check matrix H ∈ F(n−k)×nqm of support F of dimension d of an
LRPC code, a syndrome s ∈ Fn−kqm , an integer r.
Output: A subspace E of dimension 6 r such that it exists e ∈ Fnqm of support E
with HeT = sT .
1 begin
2 Compute the syndrome space S = 〈s1, · · · , sn−k〉 ;
3 Use the syndrome space expansion algorithm described in Algorithm 2 ;
4 Define Si = f−1i EF then compute the support of the error E = S1 ∩ S2 ∩ · · · ∩ Sd;
5 return E
6 end
Algorithm 2 allows to reduce the decryption failure rate by a factor q(2−r)(d−2). How-
ever, this algorithm takes a variable number of iterations to terminate, which may lead to
big variations in the global execution time. In particular, if one can determine whether
the syndrome space expansion algorithm was needed or not, the execution time may leak
some information. To prevent that, we present a variation of the syndrome space recov-
ery algorithm [4] that performs a fixed number of intersections and still fits the proof of
Theorem 5.9.
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Algorithm 4: Syndrome space expansion algorithm used in cryptography
Input: The syndrome space S and the vector space F
Output: The expanded syndrome space S ′, which may be EF
1 begin
2 for i from 1 to d− 1 do
3 Precompute Si,i+1 ;
4 end
5 for i from 1 to d− 2 do
6 tmp← S + F (Si,i+1 ⊕ Si+1,i+2 ⊕ Si,i+2) ;
7 if dim tmp 6 rd then
8 S ← tmp ;
/* tmp is used to check that m has no impact, has in
proposition 5.10 */
9 end
10 end
11 return S
12 end
5.6 Complexity of the decoding algorithm
Algorithms 1 and 2 are iterative algorithms, hence their exact complexity is hard to study
precisely. We can however give an upper bound of their complexity, by noticing that the
maximum number of iterations before the algorithms finishes is at most c: indeed, c must
decrease at each iteration, otherwise the algorithms will stop returning failure.
Proposition 5.13. The number of operations in Fq for the syndrome space expansion
algorithm using fdecode in algorithm 1 is bounded above by:
c× d(d− 1)× (d(d− 1)− 1)× 16r2d2m
Proof. As said before, the complexity of this algorithm can be bounded by c times the cost
of an iteration. When using fdecode, the most costly operation is the computation of the
intersection. Intersecting two vector spaces of dimension 2rd costs 16r2d2m operations in
Fq, and d(d− 1)× (d(d− 1)− 1) different values are possible for (i, j, k, l) at each iteration,
hence the result.
Proposition 5.14. The number of operations in Fq for the syndrome space expansion
algorithm using fprob in algorithm 2 is bounded above by :
c× d(d− 1)× 4r2d2m
Proof. The proof is the same as for proposition 5.13, except that the most costly step of
each iteration is the computation of the Sij. Intersecting two vector spaces of dimension
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rd costs 4r2d2m operations in Fq, and there are d(d− 1) Sij to compute at each iteration,
hence the result.
In order to allow constant time implementations, the syndrome space expansion algo-
rithm used in the cryptographic context computes a fixed number of intersections, so its
complexity can be derived easily:
Proposition 5.15. The number of operations in Fq for the syndrome space expansion
algorithm used in the cryptographic context in algorithm 4 is:
((d− 1) + (d− 2))× 4r2d2m
Proof. As for Proposition 5.14, the most costly step of this algorithm is the computation
of every Sij. Each intersection costs 4r2d2m, and the structure of the algorithm allows to
reduce the number of intersections to (d− 1) + (d− 2), hence the result.
In practice the algorithm for cryptographic applications is very efficient, and for the
iterative case, the upper bound is scarcely met since the algorithm usually stops before
doing the maximum number of possible iterations.
6 Applications to cryptography
LRPC codes are good candidates for use in the McEliece cryptosystem [32]. As a reminder,
the McEliece cryptosystem is a public key encryption scheme based on coding theory. Ba-
sically, the secret key is the description of a code C that we can efficiently decode and the
public key is a scrambled description of this code. To encrypt a message M , one computes
a codeword cM ∈ C and one adds to it an error e. The ciphertext is C = cM +e. If we know
the “good” description, we can decode C and recover the message whereas an attacker has
to either apply generic decoding algorithms for arbitrary codes, which amounts to trying
to solve an NP-hard problem, or recover the hidden structure of C.
Ideal LRPC codes are easy to hide since we only need to reveal its systematic parity-
check matrix. Due to their weak algebraic structure, it is hard to recover the structure of
an LRPC code from its systematic form. We can now introduce a new problem on which
the security of our cryptosystem is based:
Problem 6.1 (Ideal LRPC codes indistinguishability). Given a polynomial P ∈ Fq[X] of
degree n and a vector h ∈ Fnqm, it is hard to distinguish whether the ideal code C with the
parity-check matrix generated by h and P is a random ideal code or whether it is an ideal
LRPC code of weight d.
In other words, it is hard to distinguish whether h was sampled uniformly at random or
as x−1y mod P where the vectors x and y have the same support of small dimension d.
In [25], a structural attack against DC-LRPC codes is made by using the divisors of
Xn−1 in Fq[X]. That is why the ideal LRPC codes are particularly interesting if we choose
an irreducible polynomial for P . In this case we utterly counter this structural attack.
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The most efficient known attack against this problem consists of searching for a codeword
of weight d in the dual C⊥ of the LRPC code. Indeed, h = x−1y mod P ⇐⇒ y+xh = 0
mod P so (x|y) ∈ C⊥. The small weight codeword research algorithms are the same as
for the algorithm solving the RSD problem, so we consider the algorithm of [2]. However
this algorithm is more efficient for LRPC codes than for random codes. Indeed, since an
LRPC code admits a parity-check matrix H of small weight d, any Fq-linear combinations
of the rows of H is a codeword of weight at most d of C⊥. In the case of Ideal-LRPC
codes, the complexity of the algorithm is divided by qn. Thus the complexity of the attack
is O
(
n3m3qddm2 e−m−n
)
.
We can also consider the algebraic attacks using the Groebner bases [29]. The advantage
of these attacks is that they are independent of the size of q. They mainly depend on the
number of unknowns with respect to the number of equations. However, in the case q = 2
the number of unknowns is generally too high for the algorithms by Groebner basis to be
more efficient than combinatorial attacks. We have chosen our parameters in such a way
so that the best attacks are combinatorial: the expected complexity of the algorithms by
Groebner basis is based on the article [9].
6.1 An IND-CPA KEM based on the rank metric
Definition of a KEM
A Key-Encapsulation scheme KEM = (KeyGen,Encap,Decap) is a triple of probabilistic
algorithms together with a key space K. The key generation algorithm KeyGen generates a
pair of public and secret keys (pk, sk). The encapsulation algorithm Encap uses the public
key pk to produce an encapsulation c, and a key K ∈ K. Finally Decap using the secret
key sk and an encapsulation c, recovers the key K ∈ K or fails and return ⊥.
We define IND-CPA-security of KEM formally via the following experiment, where
Encap0 returns a valid key pair c∗, K∗, while Encap1 return a valid c∗ and a random K∗.
Indistinguishability under Chosen
Plaintext Attack : This notion states
that an adversary should not be able
to efficiently guess which key is en-
capsulated.
Expind−bE,A (λ)
1. param← Setup(1λ)
2. (pk, sk)← KeyGen(param)
3. (c∗, K∗)← Encapb(pk)
4. b′ ← A(GUESS : c∗, K∗)
5. RETURN b′
Definition 6.2 (IND-CPA Security). A key encapsulation scheme KEM is IND-CPA-secure
if for every PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) adversary A, we have that
AdvindcpaKEM (A) := |Pr[IND-CPAAreal ⇒ 1]− Pr[IND-CPAArand ⇒ 1]|
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is negligible.
Description of the scheme
Our scheme contains a hash function G modeled as a Random Oracle Model (ROM).
• KeyGen(1λ):
– choose an irreducible polynomial P ∈ Fq[X] of degree n.
– choose uniformly at random a subspace F of Fqm of dimension d and sample a
couple of vectors (x,y) $← F n × F n such that Supp(x) = Supp(y) = F .
– compute h = x−1y mod P .
– define pk = (h, P ) and sk = (x,y).
• Encap(pk):
– choose uniformly at random a subspace E of Fqm of dimension r and sample a
couple of vectors (e1, e2)
$← En × En such that Supp(e1) = Supp(e2) = E.
– compute c = e1 + e2h mod P .
– define K = G(E) and return c.
• Decap(sk):
– compute xc = xe1 + ye2 mod P and recover E with the RSR algorithm 3.
– recover K = G(E).
We need to have a common representation of a subspace of dimension r of Fqm . The
natural way is to choose the unique matrixM ∈ Fr×mq of size r×m in its row echelon form
such that the rows of M are a basis of E.
We deal with the semantic security of the KEM in Section 6.3.
Alice Bob
choose F of dimension d at random
(x,y)
$← F n × F n, h = x−1y mod P
xc = xe1 + ye2 mod P
decode s = xc and recover E
G (E)
h−−−−−→
c←−−−−−
Shared
Secret
choose E of dimension r at random
(e1, e2)
$← En × En
c = e1 + e2h mod P
G (E)
Figure 5: Informal description of our new Key Encapsulation Mechanism. h constitutes
the public key.
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6.2 An IND-CCA-2 PKE based on the rank metric
Our KEM can be slightly modified to become a PKE cryptosystem.
A Public Key Encryption (PKE) scheme is defined by three algorithms: the key gener-
ation algorithm KeyGen which takes on input the security parameter λ and outputs a pair
of public and private keys (pk, sk); the encryption algorithm Enc(pk,M) which outputs
the ciphertext C corresponding to the messageM and the decryption algorithm Dec(sk, C)
which outputs the plaintext M .
Our PKE scheme contains a hash function G modeled as a ROM.
• KeyGen(1λ):
– choose an irreducible polynomial P ∈ Fq[X] of degree n.
– choose uniformly at random a subspace F of Fqm of dimension d and sample a
couple of vectors (x,y) $← F n × F n such that Supp(x) = Supp(y) = F .
– compute h = x−1y mod P .
– define pk = (h, P ) and sk = (x,y).
• Enc(pk,M):
– choose uniformly at random a subspace E of Fqm of dimension r and sample a
couple of vectors (e1, e2)
$← En × En such that Supp(e1) = Supp(e2) = E.
– compute c = e1 + e2h mod P .
– output the ciphertext C = (c,M ⊕G(E)).
• Dec(sk, C):
– compute xc = xe1 + ye2 mod P and recover E with the ideal RSR algorithm
3.
– output M = C ⊕G(E).
6.3 Security of our schemes
Theorem 6.3. Under the Ideal LRPC indistinguishability 6.1 and the Ideal-Rank Support
Recovery 2.11 Problems, the KEM presented above in section 6.1 is indistinguishable against
Chosen Plaintext Attack in the Random Oracle Model.
Proof. We are going to proceed in a sequence of games. The simulator first starts from the
real scheme. First we replace the public key matrix by a random element, and then we use
the ROM to solve the Ideal-Rank Support Recovery.
We start from the normal game G0: We generate the public key h honestly, and E, c
also
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• In game G1, we now replace h by a random vector, the rest is identical to the previous
game. From an adversary point of view, the only difference is the distribution of h,
which is either generated at random, or as a product of low weight vectors. This is
exactly the Ideal LRPC indistinguishability problem, hence
AdvG0A ≤ AdvG1A + AdvI−LRPCA .
• In game G2, we now proceed as earlier except we receive h, c from a Support Recovery
challenger. After sending c to the adversary, we monitor the adversary queries to the
Random Oracle, and pick a random one that we forward as our simulator answer to
the Ideal-Rank Support Recovery problem. Either the adversary was able to predict
the random oracle output, or with probably 1/qG, we picked the query associated
with the support E (by qG we denote the number of queries to the random oracle G),
hence
AdvG1A ≤ 2−λ + 1/qG · AdvI−RSRA
which leads to the conclusion.
Theorem 6.4. Under the Ideal LRPC indistinguishability 6.1 and the Ideal-Rank Support
Recovery 2.11 Problems, the encryption scheme presented in section 6.2 is indistinguishable
against Chosen Plaintext Attack in the Random Oracle Model.
Proof. We are going to proceed in a sequence of games. The simulator first starts from the
real scheme. First we replace the public key matrix by a random element, and then we use
the ROM to solve the Ideal-Rank Support Recovery.
We start from the normal game G0: We generate the public key h honestly, and E, c
also
• In game G1, we now replace h by a random vector, the rest is identical to the previous
game. From an adversary point of view, the only difference is the distribution of h,
which is either generated at random, or as a product of low weight vectors. This is
exactly the Ideal LRPC indistinguishability problem, hence
AdvG0A ≤ AdvG1A + AdvI−LRPCA .
• In game G2, we now proceed as earlier except we replace G(E) by random. It can
be shown, that by monitoring the call to the ROM, the difference between this game
and the previous one can be reduced to the Ideal-Rank Support Recovery problem,
so that:
AdvG1A ≤ 2−λ + 1/qG · AdvI−RSRA .
• In a final game G3 we replace C = M ⊕ Rand by just C = Rand, which leads to the
conclusion.
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CCA-2 security proof
When applying the HHK [27] framework for the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, one can
show that the final transformation is CCA-2 secure such that:
AdvCCA−2A ≤ qG · δ + qV · 2−γ +
2qG + 1
|M| + 3Adv
CPA
A
where qG is the number of queries to the random oracleG and qV is the number of verification
queries.
As our scheme is CPA secure, the last term is negligible, we can handle exponentially
large message space for a polynomial number of queries, so the previous is too.
As shown before, our scheme is gamma-spread so again for a polynomial number of
verification queries, the term in qV is negligible.
The tricky term remaining is qG · δ, this is the product of the number of queries to the
random oracle, by the probability of generating an decipherable ciphertext in an honest
execution. For real applications, we want schemes to be correct enough so that the proba-
bility of such an occurrence is very small. This often leads, in application in running with a
probability of a magnitude of 2−64. This may seem not low enough for pure cryptographic
security, however it should be noted that this number corresponds to the number of requests
adversarially generated where the simulator gives an honest answer to a decryption query,
which would mean that a single user would be able to do as many queries as expected by
the whole targeted users in a live application, so a little trade-off at this level seems more
than fair.
6.4 Best known attacks on RSD
The complexity of practical attacks grows very fast with the size of parameters, there is
a structural reason for this: for Hamming distance a key notion for the attacks consists
of counting the number of words of length n and support size t, which corresponds to the
Newton binomial coefficient
(
n
t
)
, whose value is exponential and upper bounded by 2n. In
the rank metric case, counting the number of possible supports of size r for a rank code of
length n over Fqm corresponds to counting the number of subspaces of dimension r in Fqm :
the Gaussian binomial coefficient of size roughly qrm, whose value is also exponential
but with a quadratic term in the exponent.
There exist two types of generic attacks on the problem:
- combinatorial attacks: these attacks are usually the best ones for small values of q
(typically q = 2) and when n and k are not too small, when q increases, the combinatorial
aspect makes them less efficient.
The first non-trivial attack on the problem was proposed by Chabaud and Stern [10]
in 1996. It was improved in 2002 by Ourivski and Johannson [38] who proposed a new
attack in O ((n− k)3m3q(w−1)(k+1)). However, these two attacks did not take account of
the value of m in the exponent. Very recently the two previous attacks were generalized in
[21] (and used to break some repairs of the GPT cryposystems) moreover an algebraic new
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setting was also proposed, which gives an attack in O
(
w3k3qwd (w+1)(k+1)−n−1w e
)
. Finally, a
last improvement of the combinatorial attack of [21] was proposed this year in [2], for a
complexity of O
(
(n− k)3m3qwd (k+1)mn e−m
)
.
- algebraic attacks: the particular nature of the rank metric makes it a natural field for
algebraic attacks and solving by Groebner basis, since these attacks are largely independent
of the value of q and in some cases may also be largely independent of m. These attacks
are usually the most efficient ones when q increases. There exist different types of algebraic
equations settings to try to solve a multivariate system with Groebner basis. The algebraic
context proposed by Levy and Perret [29] in 2006 considers a quadratic setting over Fq by
taking as unknowns the support E of the error and the error coordinates regarding E. It is
also possible to consider the Kernel attack by [12] and the minor approach [11] which give
multivariate equations of degree r + 1 over Fq obtained from minors of matrices Finally,
the recent annulator setting by Gaborit et al. in [21] (which is valid on certain type of
parameters but may not be independent on m) give multivariate sparse equations of degree
qr+1 but on the large field Fqm rather than on the base field Fq. The latter attack is based
on the notion of q-polynomial [36] and is particularly efficient when r is small. Moreover,
all these attacks can be declined in an hybrid approach where some unknowns are guessed.
In practice (and for the case of this paper) for small q these attacks are less efficient than
combinatorial attacks.
6.4.1 Impact of quantum algorithms on the complexity of the attacks
In post-quantum cryptography, it is important to study the impact of quantum computer
on the security of the schemes. In rank metric cryptography, the problems on which we are
based are still difficult for a quantum computer, however there is a quantum speedup for
combinatorial attacks: the exponent of the complexity is divided by 2 [19], which lead to a
complexity of O
(
(n− k)3m3q w2 d (k+1)mn e−m
)
.
Concerning the algebraic attacks, there is currently no quantum speedup as far as we
know.
6.5 Parameters
In this section, we give some sets of parameters for a security parameters of 128, 192 and
256. In all cases, we have chosen q = 2. The choice of these parameters depends on the
probability of decryption failure and the complexity of the attacks against our cryptosystem:
1. Message attacks: they consist in solving an instance of the I− RSR problem of weight
r 2.11.
2. Attacks on the secret key: they consist to recover the structure of the Ideal-LRPC
code by computing a codeword of weight d in the dual code 6.1.
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3. Spurious key attack: as in the NTRU case (see [26]) this attack corresponds to finding
small word vectors in H with rank slightly greater than d, and to use them for
decoding. Although theoretically possible, this attack is not doable in practice since
the fact that H contains small weight vectors implies that many words of weight 2d
exist. We do not go into details in this article but as for MDPC codes [35], when
the weight increases the complexity of the attacks grows faster than the number of
small weight vectors, so that this attacks - as for NTRU and MDPC- does not work
in practice.
The different parameters are :
• n is the length the vectors h and c sent on the public channel.
• m is the degree of the extension F2m .
• d is the weight of the ideal LRPC code used in the protocol.
• r is the weight of the error.
• P is the irreducible polynomial of degree n of F2[X] which defines the ideal LRPC
code. We have chosen sparse polynomials in order to diminish the computation costs.
• the structural attack parameter is the complexity of the best attack to recover the
structure of the ideal LRPC code. It consists in looking for a codeword of weight d
in an ideal LRPC of type [2n, n]2m defined by the parity-check matrix (In|H) where
H =

h(X) mod P
Xh(X) mod P
...
Xn−1h(X) mod P
 .
Because of the structure of the ideal LRPC, the complexity of looking for a codeword
of weight d is easier than in a random code (see [1]). The complexity of the attack,
for these parameters, is O
(
(nm)ω2ddm2 e−m−n
)
where ω = log2 7 ≈ 2.8 is the cost of
linear algebra.
• the generic attack parameter is the complexity of the best attack to recover the sup-
port E. It consists to solve the I-RSD problem for a random ideal code of type
[2n, n]2m and an error of weight r. For our parameters, the complexity of this attack
is O
(
(nm)ω2rdm(n+1)2n e−m
)
where ω = log2 7 ≈ 2.8 is the cost of linear algebra.
• pf is the probability of failure of the decoding algorithm. We have chosen the param-
eters such that the theoretic upper bound is below 2−26 for the KEM. For the PKE,
it is necessary to have a lower probability of failure since the public key can be used
to encrypt a high number of messages. We give two sets of parameters: the first one
for a probability below 2−64 and the second one for a probability below 2−80.
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• the entropy parameter is the entropy of the subspace E. It is equal to log2
([
m
r
]
q
)
and has to be greater than the security parameter. We represent E by a matrix of
size r ×m in its row echelon form.
• the public key size is the number of bits needed to represent the public key h ∈ Fnqm .
It is equal to mn.
Comparison with other cryptosystems: In terms of size of public key, the system
compares very well with other proposal to the NIST competition. For 128 bits security
key exchange (in which case one is allowed to a not too small decryption failure rate) the
BIKE proposal (MDPC cryptosystem) has a public key of 10 kilo bits, hence the LRPC
cryptosystem has public keys roughly three times smaller. In terms of encryption (with very
small or null decryption failure rate), the system is comparable to the RQC cryptosystem,
and far smaller than the McEliece cryptosystem. Globally among all candidates to the
NIST competition, the LRPC cryptosystem has the second smaller size of public keys for
128 bits security, better than candidates based on lattices, but a litle larger than systems
based on isogenies. Moreover the system is also efficient in terms of speed compared to the
other NIST proposals.
Security 128 192 256
n 47 53 67
m 71 89 113
d 6 7 8
r 5 6 7
P X47 +X5 + 1 X53 +X6 +X2 +X + 1 X67 +X5 +X2 +X + 1
Structural Attack 130 207 312
Generic Attack 146 221 329
pf 2
−30 2−32 2−36
Entropy 311 499 743
Public key (bits) 3337 4717 7571
Table 1: Examples of parameters of our KEM 6.1
We also provide concrete timings of our implementations. The benchmarks were per-
formed on an Intel R©CoreTMi7-4700HQ CPU running @ up to 3.40GHz and the software
was compiled using GCC (version 6.3.0) with the following command : g++ -O2 -pedantic
-Wall -Wextra -Wno-vla.
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Security 128 192 256
n 83 83 89
m 71 101 107
d 7 7 8
r 5 5 6
P X83 +X7 +X4 +X2 + 1 X83 +X7 +X4 +X2 + 1 X89 +X38 + 1
Structural Attack 133 209 273
Generic Attack 144 195 260
pf 2
−64 2−64 2−64
Entropy 331 481 607
Public key Size (bits) 5893 8383 9523
Table 2: Example of parameters of our PKE 6.2, pf 6 2−64
Security 128 192 256
n 101 103 103
m 79 97 107
d 7 8 8
r 5 6 6
P X101 +X7 +X6 +X + 1 X103 +X9 + 1 X103 +X9 + 1
Structural Attack 136 229 259
Generic Attack 157 234 260
pf 2
−80 2−80 2−80
Entropy 371 547 607
Public key Size (bits) 7979 9991 11021
Table 3: Example of parameters of our PKE 6.2, pf 6 2−80
7 Conclusion
In this paper, as in the recent MDPC paper [35], we generalize the NTRU [26] approach
in a coding context but with the rank metric. To do so we have introduced a new family
of codes, LRPC codes, for which we propose an efficient decoding algorithm and we have
carefully analyzed its failure probability. In order to reduce the public key size, we have
chosen to use the special family of Ideal-LRPC codes.
Overall, as it is often the case for rank metric codes, the obtained results compare
well to Hamming distance cryptosystems since the difficulty of known attacks increases.
Moreover, while rank metric cryptosystems have a strong history of broken schemes because
of structural attacks based on recovering the Gabidulin code structure, the cryptosystems
we propose are the first rank-metric based cryptosystems that is not based on based on
Gabidulin codes but on codes with a weak structure and a strong random component.
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Security KeyGen Encap Decap
128 0.65 0.13 0.53
192 0.73 0.13 0.88
256 0.77 0.15 1.24
Table 4: Timings (in ms) of our KEM 6.1
Security KeyGen Encap Decap
128 1.58 0.30 1.27
192 1.74 0.31 2.09
256 1.79 0.35 2.89
Table 5: Timings (in millions of cycles) of our KEM 6.1
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A Proof of proposition 5.10
Proof. We have:
dim(F1 ∩ F2) > dim(E ∩ F1 ∩ F2) = dim(E ∩ F1) + dim(E ∩ F2) (6)
− dim ((E ∩ F1) + (E ∩ F2))
= 2r − c1 − c2 − dim(E ∩ F1 + E ∩ F2)
> 2r − c1 − c2 − dimE = r − c1 − c2.
For the second point, we need to define the projection over the quotient vector space
Fqm/E.
Let ϕ : Fqm → Fqm/E
x 7→ x+ E
ϕ is a linear map of Fq vector spaces. For all U ⊂ Fqm , U ⊂ E ⇐⇒ ϕ(U) = {0}. Moreover
we have the equality dimϕ(U) = dimU − dim(E ∩ U). Therefore,{
dimϕ(Fi) = di − r + ci
F1 ∩ F2 ⊂ E ⇐⇒ ϕ(F1 ∩ F2) = {0} .
Since ϕ(F1 ∩ F2) ⊂ ϕ(F1) ∩ ϕ(F2), ϕ(F1) ∩ ϕ(F2) = {0} =⇒ ϕ(F1 ∩ F2) = {0}. So
Prob(F1 ∩ F2 ⊂ E) > Prob(dim(ϕ(F1) ∩ ϕ(F2)) = 0).
The probability that two subspaces of dimension a and b of a vector space of dimension n
have a null intersection is given by the formula[
n− b
a
]
q
qab[
n
a
]
q
(see [24] Proposition 3.2). By taking n = m − r, a = d2 − r + c2 and b = d1 − r + c1, we
obtain
Prob ((F1 ∩ F2) ⊂ E) >
[
m− d1 − c1
d2 − r + c2
]
q[
m− r
d2 − r + c2
]
q
q(d1−r+c1)(d2−r+c2).
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To compute an approximation, let us use the formula
[
n
a
]
q
=
∏a−1
i=0
qn−qi
qa−qi .
Pa,b(n) =
[
n− b
a
]
q
qab[
n
a
]
q
=
a−1∏
j=0
qn−b − qj
qa − qj
a−1∏
i=0
qn − qi
qa − qi
qab
=
(
a−1∏
i=0
qn−b − qi
qn − qi
)
qab =
a−1∏
i=0
qn − qi+b
qn − qi
=
a−1∏
i=0
1− qi+b−n
1− qi−n .
Therefore,
lnPa,b(n) =
a−1∑
i=0
ln(1− qi+b−n)− ln(1− qi−n).
ln(1− x) = −x+O (x2) when x→ 0 hence
lnPa,b(n) =
a−1∑
i=0
(
qi−n − qi+b−n)+O (q−2n)
= q−n(1− qb)
a−1∑
i=0
qi +O (q−2n)
= −q−n(1− qb)q
a − 1
q − 1 +O
(
q−2n
)
when n→ +∞.
ex = 1 + x+O (x2) when x→ 0 =⇒ Pa,b(n) = 1− q−n(qa−1)(qb−1)q−1 +O (q−2n) By replacing
the variables, we obtain
Prob(F1 ∩ F2 ⊂ E) > 1− q
−m+r(qd1−r+c1 − 1)(qd2−r+c2 − 1)
q − 1 +O
(
q−2m
)
.
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